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Abstract
We explore the possibility that physical phenomena arising from
interacting multi-particle systems, can be usefully interpreted in terms
of multi-player games. We show how non-cooperative phenomena can
emerge from Ising Hamiltonians, even though the individual spins be-
have cooperatively. Our findings establish a mapping between two
fundamental models from condensed matter physics and game theory.
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The spatial prisoner’s dilemma game of Nowak and May [1] showed
that complex macroscopic patterns can develop and evolve in a sys-
tem even when the microscopic interactions are local in space and
time [1, 2, 3]. This is reminiscent of the observation in multi-particle
interacting systems in condensed matter physics (e.g. a spatial array
of spins) whereby different macroscopic ‘phases’ can emerge. In a sep-
arate development, multi-spin models have been shown to offer new
tools and viewpoints to help in understanding problems in informa-
tion processing and optimization problems [4]. Meanwhile multi-agent
games have recently caught physicists’ attention via Econophysics [5];
just as in more conventional condensed matter systems, it has been
shown that a renormalization of inter-agent interactions to form non-
interacting ‘crowd-anticrowd’ clusters provides a good description of
the macroscopic fluctuations [6]. Game-theoretic language has also
emerged in the quantum domain via the new field of quantum games
[7]. Of relevance to biologically-motivated physics is the finding that
mesoscopic biological systems such as viruses can play games, in par-
ticular the fundamental prisoner’s dilemma game [8]. Furthermore, it
is known that such games can exhibit a variety of non-linear dynamical
phenomena when evolved in time [9].
Given all this cirumstancial evidence, is there possibly a deeper
connection between games and physical phenomena? At first sight,
games and physics do appear to have some common elements: both
consider collections of interacting objects following certain local rules
which can give rise to a number of macroscopic configurations. How-
ever there is a fundamental problem with the analogy. Physical sys-
tems are always driven to minimize the free energy hence the global
optimal solution is preferred: particles’ behavior is therefore cooper-
ative. On the other hand, the games which are arguably most inter-
esting and important are non-cooperative: as we explain below, this
means that their Nash equilibria are not Pareto optimal.
This Letter shows that non-cooperative behavior can indeed emerge
in physical systems, even with the individual particles behaving co-
operatively. We specifically consider Ising spin models because they
serve as basic models in condensed matter physics, and focus on the
classical regime to avoid the complication of quantum entanglement
[7]. By treating each site or subset of sites in the Ising-model as a
game-playing agent, we show that non-cooperative behaviour is in-
deed possible. In particular, we show the emergence of a prisoner’s
dilemma game being ‘played’ within a multi-spin system.
We start with some necessary background material. The two-
player prisoner’s dilemma game [10] is characterized by the following
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payoff matrix:
M :=
(2, 2) (0, 3)
(3, 0) (1, 1)
.
The rows designate Rose’s choice of strategy (A or B) while the
columns designate Colin’s choice of strategy (A or B). The entry
(a, b) indicates that Rose receives payoff a while Colin receives b. A
Nash equilibrium is the set of strategy choices that provides the op-
timal payoff for each player individually: no individual player can
improve his payoff by changing strategy. There is a Nash equilib-
rium (1, 1) with payoffs 1 to each player. However the global or
‘Pareto’ optimum is (2, 2) wth payoffs 2 to each player. Since the
players have no way of ‘planning’ coordinated moves, the system will
end up choosing a payoff which is macroscopically inferior yet mi-
croscopically superior for the individual players: hence the game is
non-cooperative. Next we motivate the introduction of game-theoretic
language to a physical system, by means of the following simple ex-
ample involving two spins with a ferromagnetic spin-spin interaction:
H = −2| ↑↑〉〈↑↑ | + 2| ↑↓〉〈↑↓ | + 2| ↓↑〉〈↓↑ | − 2| ↓↓〉〈↓↓ |. At zero
temperature and at equilibrium, the system will adopt the state with
the lowest energy, i.e. | ↑↑〉 or | ↓↓〉. (Recall we are ignoring quantum
effects such as entanglement for the present discussion). The energy
of the system will now be −2. In comparison with the other two pos-
sible states (| ↑↓〉 and | ↓↑〉), the two particles have gained in stability
by losing energy. The negative form of the Hamiltonian can be used
to quantify this gain (and hence loss in energy) at zero temperature.
Hence the system has gained a payoff of 2 as compared to the value
with the spins separated to infinity. Because of the system’s symme-
try, there is no change if we exchange particles 1 and 2 – hence we
quantify the gain for each particle by dividing the total gain by two.
Hence particles 1 and 2 have gained a payoff of 1. With these defini-
tions, we may use the following game payoff matrix to represent the
physical system:
H :=
(1, 1) (−1,−1)
(−1,−1) (1, 1)
which has two equivalent Nash equilibria (1, 1).
We now consider the case of two more general subsystems each
having two possible choices of states. These subsystems may be in-
dividual spins, blocks of spins, or more general subsets of the total
many-particle system. For simplicity, we assume the two subsystems
are identical in their composition. We will prove that the global opti-
mal solutions of the total system will always be at a Nash equilibrium
and hence the interesting dilemma associated with the prisoner’s game
cannot unfortunately arise. We suppose that the states of subsystems
3
1 and 2 are completely described by the vectors ~x and ~y respectively.
A general Hamiltonian for the combined system will have the form:
H1+H2+H12 whereH1 andH2 are the internal energies of the subsys-
tems when separated (or equivalently, when the interaction is turned
off) while H12 is the interaction term. The symmetry within the sys-
tem means that we can denote H1 = H2 ≡ H and H12 = H21 ≡ I.
The condition H(~x) = H(~y) implies that no one particular state is
preferred and so the two subsystems will have equal incentive to start
in any of the two states before the interaction is turned on. Since the
two subsystems share the payoff in the interaction term, they each
have the payoff [−H(.) − I(.)/2]. It follows that whichever strategy
they each adopt, the two subsystems will always have the same payoffs.
To complete the proof, we first define the set of best replies with re-
spect to ~y for system 1 to be B1(~y) := {~x
∗ : P1(~x
∗, ~y) ≥ P1(~x, ~y),∀~x}.
In words, given that system 2 has adopted state-vector ~y then the
choice of state-vector ~x∗ by system 1 yields the maximum payoff P1.
The set of best replies is defined similarly for system 2. Using this
notation, a Nash equilibrium represents an operator profile (~x, ~y) for
which ~x ∈ B1(~y) and ~y ∈ B2(~x). If (~x
∗, ~y∗) is a global optimal state,
then by definition ~x∗ ∈ B1(~y
∗) and ~y∗ ∈ B2(~x
∗) and so (~x∗, ~y∗) is a
solution at Nash equilibrium. Therefore, in this ‘two-player-two-move’
symmetric scenario, the global optimal solutions are always at Nash
equilibrium. We will refer to this situation as cooperative, noting that
this word has a somewhat more general meaning in game theory [10].
The above analysis indicates that any effective two-body (i.e. two-
subsystem) Hamiltonion system containing just two strategies/states,
is cooperative.
So can macroscopic non-cooperative behavior ever arise? We now
show that it can, if the subsystem under consideration has several pos-
sible configurations and hence more states from which to choose. In
particular, we will search for non-cooperative phenomena in two sub-
systems each containing many spins. We concentrate on the specific
example of non-cooperation offered by the prisoner’s dilemma, since
this is the only symmetric two-player two-strategy game with a unique
Nash equilibrium which never coincides with the global optimum [9].
We start by specifying more precisely the criterion for the existence
of non-cooperative behaviour. A system composed of two-body Ising
Hamiltonians such as
H = a
(
| ↑↑〉〈↑↑ | − | ↑↓〉〈↑↓ | − | ↓↑〉〈↓↑ |+ | ↓↓〉〈↓↓ |
)
,
may easily be represented as a graph. For example, consider the fol-
lowing graphical representation of the total Hamiltonian for a particu-
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lar five-particle spin system comprising various two-body interactions:
↑1 · · · (−2) · · · ↑2
...
...
(3) (3) ≡ H5
...
...
↓3 · · · (−2) · · · ↓4 · · · (−1) · · · ↓5
where entries in brackets denotes the a-parameters in the five-body
Hamiltonian. The total Hamiltonian may then be represented by the
following matrix:
H5 ≡


0 −2 3 0 0
−2 0 0 3 0
3 0 0 −2 0
0 3 −2 0 −1
0 0 0 −1 0

 .
We now consider the coexistence of two subsystems, each containing
n spins. In order that the total system can be considered as exhibit-
ing the prisoner’s dilemma scenario, the following requirements must
be met: (1) there are two locally stable states that each subsystem
can be in when they are separated, i.e. in the absence of interaction
terms between the subsystems; (2) when the two subsystems are put
together, i.e. when the interactions between them are turned on, the
final state of the two subsystems depends on the initial states of these
two subsystems; (3) the final payoff for each subsystem (as defined
above) must reproduce the same form as the prisoner’s dilemma pay-
off matrix. By symmetry, we require that the two subsystems are
identical and that all interactions are invariant under the exchange of
the two subsystems. Therefore, it must be possible to write the overall
Hamiltonian in the following form:
M :=
[
X Y
Y X
]
, (1)
where [X] denotes the Hamiltonian for each system when isolated,
and [Y ] denotes the interaction between the two subsystems. We note
that X and Y must be symmetric matrices in order to render the
resulting game symmetric. We will represent ↑ by 1 and ↓ by −1
and can hence represent the state of the whole system by a string
δ1 . . . δ2n with δk = 1 or −1. The total energy of the system will be
1
2
∑
i,j δiδjMij . The payoff for subsystem 1 will be the negative of the
sum corresponding to the upper half of the matrixM , while the payoff
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for subsystem 2 will be the negative of the sum corresponding to the
lower half of the matrix M . From now on, we will use A and B to
denote the two states corresponding to the two strategies.
With all the criteria for non-cooperativity laid out, we are now
ready to discuss under what conditions non-cooperative behavior is
possible. We will concentrate on the infinite-range Ising model and
will look for the minimal number of restrictions for two interacting
subsystems which each contain n spins. By condition (1), we see that
we need to construct two wells with the same energy at the bottom.
In general, this would mean one equality and 2n inequalities. The
equality comes from the equal energies for the two ground states of
the subsystems before interacting, and the 2n inequalities come from
the fact that the whole system is equivalent to a 2n-dimensional vec-
tor space where each element has 2n neighbors in terms of Hamming
distance. But since we are looking for the minimum number of restric-
tions, we may choose the two states corresponding to the bottoms of
the two wells to be adjacent: for example, the state |00 . . . 00〉 and
|00 . . . 01〉 (where for simplicity, we are now representing ↑ by 0 and ↓
by 1). In this case only one equality and 2n − 2 inequalities need to
be satisfied. However the two initial states cannot be adjacent since
we do not want (A,A) = |00 . . . 00〉 ⊗ |00 . . . 00〉 to be adjacent to
(A,B) = |00 . . . 00〉 ⊗ |00 . . . 01〉; if it were adjacent, then there is an
incentive for the whole system to go from one configuration to another,
thereby implying that the resulting game may not have well-defined
payoffs. Fortunately, due to the symmetry in the Ising Hamiltonians,
we may replace 00 . . . 01 by 11 . . . 10. Therefore, we designate 00 . . . 00
and 11 . . . 10 to be the two initial states (i.e. strategies) A and B
respectively. We note that since the interactions have infinite range,
it does not matter where the 1s and 0s are located. In terms of the
entries in matrix (1), we have the following equalities and inequalities:∑
1≤j≤n
xnj = 0 (2)
∑
1≤j≤n
xkj > 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (3)
∑
1≤j≤n−1
xkj − xkn > 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. (4)
We now come to condition 2. In order to obtain the least number
of restrictions, we again require that the state (A,A) is at a local
minimum of the whole system, which amounts to n inequalities:∑
1≤j≤n
(xkj + ykj) > 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (5)
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Similarly, requiring the state (B,B) to be at local minimum means:∑
1≤j≤n−1
(xkj − ykj)− xkn − ykn > 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (6)
∑
1≤j≤n−1
(−xnj − ynj)− xnn + ynn > 0 (7)
Using Eq. 2, we can write Eq. 7 as:∑
1≤j≤n−1
(−ynj) + ynn > 0 (8)
If the initial state of the whole system is at state (A,B), we then
require that the first system, which is at state |00 . . . 00〉, transform
itself to state |10 . . . 00〉. Therefore, the whole system will then be at
state |10 . . . 00〉 ⊗ |11 . . . 10〉. We further require that it is at a local
minimum. Hence the following inequalities apply:∑
1≤j≤n−1
(y1j − x1j)− y1n > 0 (9)
∑
1≤j≤n−1
(xkj − ykj) + xkn + ykn > 0 , 2 ≤ k ≤ n (10)
∑
1≤j≤n−1
(xkj − ykj)− xkn − ykn > 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (11)
∑
1≤j≤n
ynj > 0. (12)
Finally, since the prisoner’s payoff table is desired, we need the fol-
lowing three inequalities concerning the payoffs in different scenarios:∑
1≤j≤n
ynj − ynn > 0 (13)
−yn1 −
∑
1≤k≤n−1
2≤j≤n
ykj > 0 (14)
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∑
1≤j≤n−1
x1j +
∑
2≤k≤n−1
1≤j≤n−1
ykj −
∑
2≤j≤n−1
ynj > 0. (15)
Indeed, there are 6n inequalities and 1 equality in total. We know
that if there are 6n + 1 arbitrary parameters, then the above system
of inequalities has a solution [11]. However by exploiting many of
the redundancies inherent in the system, we will now show that only
n + 2 non-zero parameters are actually needed. Table 1 summarizes
the ranges of these inequalities. From Table 1, we see that for k = 1
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we may set every parameter to zero except b1, d1 and f1, which satisfy
the following inequalities:
b1 > 0 (16)
d1 > 0 (17)
f1 < 0 (18)
d1 > b1 + f1. (19)
For k = n, since we have set f1 to be non-zero and Y is symmetric, we
have dn = f1. Hence we may now set every parameter to zero except
dn, en and fn. The following inequalities then follow:
en > −f1 (20)
fn > 0 (21)
fn > en + f1. (22)
For 2 ≤ k ≤ n−1, we may set all parameters to zero except bk. Recall
that we have already set en > 0 hence we may now also set bk > en.
Finally, we come back to Eqs 14 and 15, which yields two further
inequalities:
− 2f1 > en (23)
2b1 > f1. (24)
The following form corresponds to two n = 3 spin subsystems, and
is one of many possible scenarios which satisfies the above require-
ments:
X :=

 0 2 02 0 0
0 0 0

 ; Y :=

 2 0 −10 0 1.5
−1 1.5 2

 ,
The corresponding payoff matrix is:
M :=
(4.5, 4.5) (1, 5)
(5, 1) (3.5, 3.5)
. (25)
By considering the number of non-zero parameters required, one can
deduce that an n = 3-spin subsystem ‘playing’ against another n =
3-spin subsystem is the smallest total system which exhibits non-
cooperative behaviour within the Ising framework: the phrase ‘two’s
company but three’s a crowd’ therefore comes to mind [6]. The
above discussion has been mostly concerned with infinite-range in-
teractions, however we note that one may also analyse the positions
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of the non-zero parameters in order to discuss various other models
such as nearest-neighbor interaction models, etc.
We now return to discuss whether the Ising-based games consid-
ered here exhibit similar behavior to that observed in spatial games.
One interesting phenomenon observed in the spatial prisoner’s game is
the coexistence of different strategies up to some critical point [1]. It
turns out that this same phenomenon also occurs for our Ising games.
To show this, we consider a large system with many n-spin subsys-
tems such that each subsystem is playing a prisoner’s game with its
immediate neighbors. In order that the subsystems evolve their strate-
gies, we add in fluctuations which we assume to be thermal. At low
enough temperature, only very few subsystems (which are statisti-
cally far apart) will have the chance to change their states at a given
timestep. These subsystems will, with high probability, change to a
state which minimizes their free energy – we assume this to be close
to the energy that we use to construct the payoff matrix table. Re-
gardless of what their neighbors’ states actually are, these subsystems
will always choose state B. (If their neighbors are in state A, they can
exploit their neighbors by adopting state B, whereas if their neighbors
are in state B, then adopting state B is the best they can do). We
note that this is in marked contrast to previous assumptions used in
spatial games [1, 3], where agents were usually assumed to imitate
the strategy of the best player in their neighborhood; since a subsys-
tem cannot ‘know’ the surrounding subsystems’ payoffs, it can only
maximize its own payoff given any particular situation. At low enough
temperature, the whole system will evolve to the situation where every
subsystem is in state B given any initial condition. This resembles the
phenomenon of condensation. By contrast, if the temperature is high
enough that many subsystems are allowed to change their states simul-
taneously but still low enough that the free energies exhibit a payoff
matrix similar to the prisoner’s dilemma (see Eq. (25)), then with
high probability neighboring sites or blocks of neighboring sites may
be able to change their states together. Then with high probability,
the subsystems in the block will all end up in state A because it max-
imizes the payoff for the whole block. Therefore at high temperature,
the majority of sites will adopt state A. Just as for the spatial games
considered previously in the literature, a whole spectrum of scenarios
is possible for the Ising games even though the detailed dynamics of
these two models may have different origins. Beside thermal fluctua-
tions, we may also consider a fluctuation in the payoffs. In Ref. [1],
Nowak and May used the following payoff matrix:
M :=
(1, 1) (0, b)
(b, 0) (0, 0)
(26)
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where b > 1. They found that a region where the coexistence of both
strategies is encouraged, appears for 1.8 < b < 2. In our Ising games,
this is also what one expects to happen: when b is close to the pre-
scribed range, the configurations (A,A), (A,B) and (B,A) will all have
similar global energies, hence all three configurations are preferred at
high enough temperature such that neighboring subsystems can evolve
together. This similarity in the region of interest further strengthens
the tie between spatial games and condensed matter systems.
Finally we note that the kind of fluctuation considered here is
different from the conventional models considered in the fluctuating
systems literature associated with spin glasses and other condensed
matter systems. Instead it is usually assumed that given enough time,
a system will achieve equilibrium: the fluctuation of the whole system
is taken to mean that the subsystems fluctuate as well, hence the
whole system has an incentive to move to equilibrium. Here we en-
counter something different: given the initial conditions, some subsys-
tems can actually benefit from the fluctuation and so have no incentive
to increase the global payoff. For more general models, such as the
Heisenberg model, one would expect quantum fluctuations to play an
essential role, thereby suggesting a possible future role for quantum
game theory [7].
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Table 1: Table of inequalities Eq. (3)–(13) where akxk1 + bk
∑
2≤j≤n−1 xkj +
ckxkn + dkyk1 + ek
∑
2≤j≤n−1 ykj + fkykn > 0.
ak bk ck dk ek fk
k = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 –1 –1 –1 –1
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 –1 0 0 0
–1 –1 0 1 1 –1
k = n 0 0 0 –1 –1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 –1 –1 –1 –1
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 –1 0 0 0
1 1 1 –1 –1 1
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